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The inward mobility of labour can serve as a driver of economic growth and the immigration 
policies of many countries are orientated towards this end. However immigration is also a 
contentious issue, with the general public often displaying hostility towards liberal immigration 
policies. The compromises between economic and political considerations that states make 
when developing immigration policy are poorly theorised in academic literature. The study 
contributes to conceptual understandings of the voices of ‘elites’ in the political-economy of 
immigration policy through a critical interrogation of the narratives and preferences of 
employers in the context of the ongoing Scottish constitutional change debate.  
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Introduction  
Immigration can drive economic growth, but it is also a highly contentious issue. One of the 
central responsibilities of independent nation states is to formulate and implement an 
immigration policy; that is to legislate on the quantities of migrants that can legitimately enter 
a country, their qualities, and the source countries that they can come from (Bach, 2010). Such 
decisions inevitably incur compromises between competing policy agendas. On the one hand, 
economic theory postulates that liberal ‘open-door’ immigration policies are most conducive 
to the aggregate economic welfare of countries (Giordani and Ruta, 2011). However there are 
few, if any, examples of developed countries operating open-door immigration policies. 
Conceptually, this paradox has been referred to as the ‘immigration policy puzzle’: liberal 
immigration policies favour economic growth yet they are not fully pursued by states (Giordani 
and Ruta, 2011, 922). This contradiction can be explained by the fact that most governments 
are democratically accountable, typically to electorates that are opposed to significant levels of 
immigration. For example the 2013 version of the respected British Social Attitudes survey 
pointed to over three quarters (77%) of the British public wanting a reduction in immigration, 
the highest proportion ever recorded in the surveys 30 year history (BSA, 2014).  
 
However public opinion cannot fully explain immigration policy, since this would result in 
legislation being much more restrictive than is usually the case. Theoretically this disparity 
between the restrictionist desires of the public (and reductionist rhetoric from politicians) and 
the actual immigration policies implemented by governments has been described as the ‘public 
opinion gap’ and has been found to exist in most developed countries (Facchini and Mayda, 
2009; Freeman, 2002). 
 
States thus have an ambivalent approach to migration, with immigration policy being an 
inconsistent compromise between the interests of business (liberal immigration policy) and 
those of the electorate (restrictive immigration policy). How do democratically accountable 
governments go about ‘squaring the circle’ between these mutually opposing interests? The 
literature on the political-economy of migration policy is sparse (Facchini et al, 2008), and the 
studies which have been conducted frequently rely on statistical abstractions of the ‘optimal’ 
levels of migration, for example as favoured or tolerated by voters of varying skill levels 
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(Benhabib, 1996) or according to the net fiscal impact of inflows (Giordani and Ruta, 2011). 
Additionally, theoretical understandings of international labour mobility have tended to ignore 
or underplay the role of the state in actively channelling such flows. Contrary to this Morawska 
(2007) does incorporate the state into her understanding of international migration, arguing that 
a small number of hegemonic states dominate global trade, finance and mobility patterns 
through the concentration of political and economic power. This develops the pertinent point 
that governments do not just arbitrate between different interests in immigration policy, but are 
an important actor in stimulating and perpetuating international migration (Russell, 1989; 
McCollum et al, 2013). Whilst valuable in identifying the state as a migration channel as well 
as intermediary, these perspectives have however shied away from conceptualising the 
preferences and actions of important actors in the process of immigration legislation formation. 
Immigration policy theory is thus an underdeveloped field (Meyers, 2000), with only a small 
number of scholars seeking to bridge the gap between political economy and migration studies 
(see Cerna, 2014; Caviedes, 2010; Menz, 2011 for praiseworthy exceptions).  
 
This investigation seeks to contribute to understandings of immigration policy theory by 
examining the preferences and role of one particular group of actors, employers, in immigration 
policy. The following section offers a review of the existent literature on this topic. This is 
followed by a description of the Scottish case and the ways in which it can act as an empirical 
lens through which the political-economy of immigration policy can be explored. The 
methodological perspectives employed in the research are then discussed, followed by a 
presentation of the research findings. The article concludes by considering how these sit within 
and may advance theoretical understandings of the political-economy of immigration policy.  
 
The political-economy of immigration policy: existing understandings   
The issues considered in this analysis sit broadly within so-called domestic politics models of 
immigration policy theory. The starting point for these perspectives is the (contested) 
assumption that state is a neutral space, whose function is to adjudicate between competing 
interests. According to Meyers (2000) policymaking then is the end result of bargaining and 
compromises between these interests or, more radically, a consequence of one or more of these 
actors capturing the state. This is a point well-argued by scholars such as Anderson (2010) and 
Scott (2013), who contend that immigration policies can serve to produce ‘precarious’ or 
‘good’ workers over whom employers and labour users have particular mechanisms of control. 
There is a long history of employers in Britain and elsewhere seeking to encourage more liberal 
immigration regimes (Collins, 1988; Esser and Korte, 1985; Freeman, 1979; Craig, 1971) and 
according to Menz (2011) and Spencer (2003) these pressures have been influential in the 
liberalisation of national labour migration policies across Europe since the mid-1990s.  
 
Perhaps the most prolific commentator on the political economy of immigration policy is the 
US political scientist Gary Freeman. In line with Anderson (2010), Freeman (1995) draws 
parallels between the configuration of immigration policies and pro-business interests. In this 
sense the ‘public opinion gap’ on immigration policy (Facchini and Mayda, 2009) is said to 
exist because the electoral system is regarded as an ineffective means of directly mandating 
specific policy choices (Freeman, 1995). As a consequence interest groups such as employers, 
ethnic groups, trade unions and nationalist groupings, despite each only representing a minority 
of the population, can have a disproportionate influence on immigration policy (Meyers, 2000). 
As Freeman and Kessler point out, this is because ‘in the legislative, administrative and 
electoral process the interests of organised groups are more important than the opinions of 
individuals’ (2008, 670). The relative strength of the interest groups who benefit from 
immigration is said to lead to a ‘client politics’ (Freeman, 1995, 886) whereby organisations 
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favouring expansionist immigration policies develop and nurture relationships with the 
officials responsible for immigration policy and influence policy in other surreptitious ways 
beyond the scrutiny of public debate. Immigration policy is thus often portrayed as the result 
of an organised pro-migration lobby ‘winning over’ a resource weak and diffuse anti-migration 
lobby. 
 
Much of the literature discussed above centres primarily on the US context, where pro-business 
influences on immigration policy may be expected to be relatively powerful. Few studies have 
attempted to explore how these dynamics operate in other contexts. A notable exception is the 
work of Statham and Geddes (2006) on the drivers of UK immigration politics. Taking a 
contrasting position to that espoused by Freeman, this approach focuses on the salient point 
that immigration policy is influenced by much more than just collective action by interest 
groups. A somewhat obvious but important point in this respect is that the actual mechanisms, 
and effects, of pro-business/migration interest group influence on policy are ill suited to 
empirical elucidation. Thus it would be foolhardy to make the case that employers (presuming 
homogeneity and a clear and unified voice) exert X influence via Y strategies and that the 
resultant immigration policy is Z. Rather a much more realistic approach may be to conceive 
of pro-businesses/immigration voices as a potentially powerful force in immigration policy 
formation, but as a set of voices that competes internally and with other influential actors, that 
speaks with different accents and that exerts influence in often intangible, unintended and 
contradictory ways (Caviedes, 2010).  
 
As opposed to a pro-business lobby or sceptical public directly determining immigration 
policy, Statham and Geddes (2006) make the valuable point that it is political elites (politicians 
and government officials) who are the ultimate actors in producing policy. These elites are said 
to be relatively insensitive to direct action by interest groups, but instead consciously and 
subconsciously ‘internalise’ the messages purveying from opinion polls, the media and 
business groups; which in turn goes on to influence their policy decisions in often imperceptible 
ways. Another adept study of interest group influence on immigration policy is provided by 
Menz (2011), who examines what he calls the important but widely overlooked role of 
employer associations in shaping immigration legislation. Again, Menz (2011) emphasises that 
there is not a direct causal link between employer preferences and practices and immigration 
policy, and that such a link, if it does exist, is difficult to assess empirically. Key actors in terms 
of pro-immigration business interest groups in the UK include organisations such as the British 
Chambers of Commerce and the Confederation of British Industry. Sector specific interest 
groups also exist, such as Oil UK and the Recruitment and Employment Confederation for 
example. These employer associations are each comprised of a large number of individual 
businesses and whilst they claim to ‘lobby’ policymakers for expansionist immigration 
legislation, the academic literature has little to say about how these strategies operate, how 
effective they ultimately are or whether they accurately reflect the preferences of the 
multifarious business interests that they claim to represent.  
 
A criticism that can be levied at the perspectives discussed above is that, whilst they consider 
whether immigration policy can be influenced by special interest groups such as employers, 
they do not attempt the admittedly challenging task of deciphering how these processes might 
operate. Another important point to draw attention to is the limitations of employer influence. 
Immigration policies are patently more expansive than the general public would wish them to 
be, which could be attributed to pro-business influences. However they are also much less 
expansionist than businesses would like them to be. Therefore immigration policy might be 
seen as a messy compromise between economics and politics, a trade-off in which the interests 
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of neither is fully satisfied. This is a tricky dilemma that has faced policymakers for some time, 
with Western European governments having largely failed in their initial attempts to import 
labour but not people (Castles and Kosack, 1973).  
 
Related to this point is the view put forward by Boswell, who makes the case that states often 
practice what she terms ‘intentional incoherence’ (2007, 96) in policymaking. This policy 
‘incoherence’ is regarded as a deliberate ploy, which allows the state to follow an economic 
growth agenda whilst also retaining its ‘legitimacy’ in the eyes of its citizens through calculated 
(but usually limited) anti-immigration rhetoric and measures. The motive behind ostensibly 
muddled immigration policies may therefore be to attempt to at least partially simultaneously 
satisfy pro- and anti-immigration interests. The policy balance between these competing 
interests inevitably varies over time and across space. The particular applicability of these 
debates to the Scottish case is discussed below.  
 
Immigration patterns, perceptions and policies: the Scottish case  
In some respects the case of Scotland can be thought of as rather particular with regards to 
migration. Firstly, Scotland is an advanced developed nation yet until recently it lost more 
people than it has gained through migration. Consequently international migrants make up a 
small part of Scotland’s population relative to many other European countries (Packwood and 
Findlay, 2014). Secondly, analysis of social attitudes survey data infers that the general public 
in Scotland is somewhat hostile to immigration, but less so than is the case in other parts of the 
UK (McCollum et al, 2014). Thirdly a modest rate of natural increase means that Scotland is 
heavily reliant on immigration for demographic stability and growth in the short to medium 
terms. Recognition of these demographic trends, coupled with a conviction that immigration 
can boost economic growth, has led the Scottish Government to enact an official Population 
Target, which aims to see population growth in Scotland match the EU-15 average over the 
period 2007-2017 (Scottish Government, 2011).  
 
Whilst it could be argued that Scotland ‘needs’ migrants on demographic and economic 
grounds, and has a population that is relatively less hostile towards immigration, paradoxically 
the Scottish Government has little direct control over immigration policy. Under the 1998 
Scotland Act which reinstated the Scottish Parliament, the immigration system and border 
controls were issues which remained ‘reserved’ to the UK government. The positive policy 
rhetoric in Scotland concerning migration stands in stark contrast to debates at the UK level 
generally, where the issue of immigration frequently dominates the political agenda and is 
regularly discussed in pejorative terms (Hepburn and Rosie, 2014). Despite the Office for 
Budget Responsibility (2013) highlighting the fiscal benefits of immigration, the mainstream 
political parties in Westminster are firmly committed to reductions as opposed to increases in 
international inflows. As such, whilst the Scottish Government wishes to pursue modestly 
expansionist immigration policies, it is currently unable to do so and must instead operate under 
the same ‘one size fits all’ immigration legislation as the rest of the UK.  
 
Whilst the ultimate outcome of the 2014 plebiscite was a No vote (and the Smith Commission 
that followed the independence vote did not propose that control over immigration should 
devolve to Scotland), the independence referendum represented an opportunity for Scotland to 
develop a more nuanced immigration policy that fits more closely with its needs, either through 
full independence or further devolution of powers from Westminster. This possibility of change 
provided an opportunity for employers to identify the immigration policy issues that are 
relevant to their businesses. In the UK as elsewhere, employers collaborate with the state to 
access international labour (Rodriguez, 2004). From an employer’s perspective, there are 
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grounds for optimism in this regard: the Scottish Government has consistently espoused the 
benefits of immigration and has sought to attract specific types of migrants to Scotland (most 
notably students with the potential to add to the country’s talent pool). In the Scotland’s Future 
White Paper, the Scottish Government reiterated this desire, stating that: ‘Scotland has a 
different need for immigration than other parts of the UK… the current UK immigration system 
has not supported Scotland’s migration priorities’ (Scottish Government, 2013, 267-8). 
Interestingly in the Scottish case and elsewhere, pro-immigration politics produce what 
Freeman and Kessler (2008, 672) term ‘strange bedfellow’ coalitions consisting of a curious 
mix of cosmopolitans, employers and ethnic minority groups, each in favour of expansionist 
immigration policies but for very different reasons. According to Cerna (2014) the varying 
ability of these pro-immigration coalitions to exert pressure on governments can explain 
variations in immigration policies in specific spatial and temporal contexts. Scotland is 
therefore an interesting empirical lens through which the political economy of immigration 
policy can be explored. The ‘coalition’ favouring immigration in Scotland is arguably broader 
than is the case in the UK generally and includes the groups traditionally in favour of 
immigration (employers, ethnic groups) but also the mainstream political parties and a 
relatively large part of the public. However even in Scotland a potentially significant pro-
immigration coalition sits against wider voter opposition by some members of the general 
public to immigration. Whilst the general public in Scotland are less hostile to immigration 
than other parts of the UK, a majority of Scots are opposed to rather than in favour of future 
inflows (McCollum et al, 2014; Bell et al, 2014). The three research questions which the 
research aimed to address were; 
1. What narratives and discourses do employers invoke to try and justify their desires 
concerning immigration policies? 
2. How articulate are employers with regards to the particular immigration policies that 
they would like to see enacted? 
3. To what extent are employers actively engaged in strategies to achieve their preferred 
immigration policies?  
 
Methodological perspective  
As Scott (2013) and Rodriguez (2004) have pointedly argued, employer-orientated research 
remains an unjustifiably neglected area of migration studies. The focus of this analysis is on 
how employers and employer associations in Scotland go about framing their preferences 
regarding immigration policies. Signiﬁcantly, the literature emphasises that the ‘requirement’ 
for migrant labour should not be regarded as a ‘given’. Rather ‘labour shortages are socially, 
economically, culturally and politically constructed and ... need not exist’ (Geddes and Scott 
2010: 211). Alternatives to the widespread use of migrant labour could arguably be pursued by 
employers, such as offering higher wages to attract more local labour into work or the 
substitution of capital for labour. Thus, it is important to question why employers elect to 
perceive and represent migrant labour as essential or desirable, and to investigate the nature of 
the relationship between these discourses and immigration policy in terms of how states 
legislate on the quantities of migrants that can legitimately enter a country, their qualities, and 
the source countries that they can come from. This analysis aims to critically examine the 
narratives created by labour market actors to rationalise why Scotland should have a relatively 
liberal immigration policy.  
 
Employer discourses surrounding migration therefore are significant and worthy of scrutiny 
because they will represent a powerful voice in the debates over the future of Scotland’s stance 
towards immigration, whatever the outcome of the independence referendum. Of course 
employers in Scotland are a far from homogenous group, and many individuals within firms 
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hold views towards constitutional change and immigration that are at odds with the 
economically rational ‘pro-business’ view that Scotland should have influence over its 
immigration policy and that it should enact expansionist legislation. In line with Caviedes’s 
(2010) reminder that there is often little consensus amongst employers or dominant economic 
sectors in terms on influence on immigration policy, the analysis seeks to be sensitive to the 
tensions and internal contradictions that exist within the discourses constructed by elites such 
as Scottish employers in relation to immigration.  
 
This approach hopes to advance academic understandings of employer discourses surrounding 
labour and immigration and how they should be conceptualised. Scholarship on this issue can 
be guilty of homogenising employers and treating them uniformly as ‘elites’. Scotland is not 
alone in having a diverse economy, thus the term ‘employers’ covers a broad range of firms of 
varying sizes, sectors and priorities: at risk of stating the obvious the practices and preferences 
of a large multinational oil firm operating in the North Sea are very different to those of a small 
fruit farm in rural Perthshire. As well as recognising tensions between employers, it is 
important to recognise that firms are collections of individuals. So whilst businesses may seek 
to influence policy decisions in their favour, the policies that they argue for may well be at 
odds with the personal views of many of the individuals that constitute the staff of these firms. 
For example an HR manager may be opposed to migration on a personal level, but recognise 
its positive impact on the functioning of his/her business. Academic analysis needs to be 
sensitive to these internal contradictions and tensions within ‘employer’ narratives. This has 
implications for understandings of the apparent tussle between employers and the electorate in 
terms of the desired orientation of immigration policies and for thinking about which ‘voices’ 
academics should privilege when reporting on these debates. The following section describes 
the data collection strategy that was undertaken in this research.  
 
Twenty employers and employer associations were interviewed in a number of key economic 
sectors in Scotland in the second half of 2013. The interviews were designed to solicit employer 
views of: immigration policy, how effective it is in meeting their needs and whether the 
prospect of constitutional change in Scotland was seen as an opportunity to try and push for 
more favourable policy rhetoric and practice. One of the challenges associated with 
interviewing ‘elites’ is access (Rice, 2010). Initially this was facilitated through contacts with 
large Scottish employers and inter-business organisations. However most interviews were 
secured through a tactic of ‘cold calling’ specific businesses. Around one in five of the 
businesses contacted in this manner ended up participating in the research. The most commonly 
cited reasons for non-participation were that potential respondents felt they could not offer 
anything of value to the research or that they simply did not have time to take part.  
 
Organisations were targeted in parts of the Scottish economy which attach importance to the 
availability of migrant labour. Employer preferences have been shown to vary by sector 
(Caviedes, 2010), for this reason the research sought to engage with a range of economic 
activities. These sectors were identified using the results of an online survey which was 
designed by the authors, disseminated through the Scottish Chambers of Commerce and 
completed by over 700 employers in early summer 2013 (Tindal et al, 2014). The sectors 
emerging from the survey as being of particular interest were: health and social care, hospitality 
and tourism, construction, retail, property, agriculture, wholesale, and transport and storage. 
The researchers also wished to gain the perspectives of high-value sectors in the Scottish 
economy, and so finance and insurance, oil and gas, and higher education were also 
incorporated into the sample (see Table 1). Given that the sampling strategy was orientated 
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towards some sectors with a specific interest in migration, it is worth bearing in mind that the 
findings discussed below may not be representative of the Scottish economy in general.  
 
Table 1: Sector and category of interview respondents 
Sector Category 
1. Hospitality Stakeholder 
2. Recruitment industry Stakeholder 
3. Business community Stakeholder 
4. Trades Union Stakeholder 
5. Education Stakeholder 
6. Agribusiness Employer 
7. Oil and gas Employer 
8. Transport Employer 
9. Oil and gas Employer 
10. Finance Employer 
11. Healthcare Employer 
12. Hospitality Employer 
13. Tourism Stakeholder 
14. Social care Stakeholder 
15. Retail Employer 
16. Transport and logistics Stakeholder 
17. Transport and logistics Stakeholder 
18. Business community Stakeholder 
19. ICT Employer 
20. ICT Employer 
 
Given likely variations in migration preferences by employer size (Caviedes, 2010), the 
companies covered by the research ranged from small employers to large multi-national 
corporations. In the case of small or medium sized companies, the interviewees were usually 
company directors. For larger organisations, the interviewees were most often directors of 
human resources or directors of operations. Other stakeholders that were included were 
directors or representatives of inter-business organisations, or representatives of specific 
economic sectors. Many of the stakeholders interviewed also held positions in specific 
companies as well as working as industry representatives. These stakeholders generally had an 
expansive overview of the sector as a whole, identifying challenges and opportunities that exist 
in the respective sectors that they represent, not just for specific companies. Ten of the twenty 
interviews were with employers and the other half were with stakeholders (inter-business 
organisations and representatives of specific economic sectors). Pseudonyms have been used 
to protect respondent anonymity.  
 
Analysis: ‘elite’ voices, immigration and immigration policy   
The investigation focuses on three key themes: (1) the narratives used by employers and 
employer associations to construct immigration as being a ‘good thing’, (2) articulations of the 
‘ideal’ immigration policy for Scotland, and (3) the strategies used to try and influence 
immigration policies at the UK and Scotland levels. The discussion seeks to be sensitive to the 
tensions and contradictions between and within these narratives. The findings are then used to 
consider the wider implications for how employers’ voices are conceptualised in migration 
research.  
 
Immigration as a ‘good thing’  
Not surprisingly the research found that employers universally spoke of immigration in positive 
economic terms. In general migrants were lauded as filling labour shortages, particularly in 
rural areas and in instances where the local supply of labour is derided as being of poor quality. 
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Towards the higher end of the labour market, migrant workers were described as essential in 
addressing sector specific skills shortages (e.g. in healthcare and oil and gas) and as a catalyst 
for growth for multinational companies with operations in Scotland (e.g. through intra-
company transfers). The underlying factors driving businesses to either require or favour 
immigrant skills are well rehearsed (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010) and are not repeated here. What 
is more interesting is how immigration was positioned as being a ‘good thing’ not only for their 
specific businesses but for Scotland more generally. Employers sought to align their business 
interests with what they represented as those of Scotland’s economy, thus legitimising their 
preferences for supporting liberal immigration policies. The narratives constructed by 
interviewees to frame immigration as being of value to Scotland are summarised in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Employer narratives regarding the benefits of immigration for Scotland  
Narrative  Signifiers of ‘value’  
Demographic boost: improves working age 
population relative to retirees   
‘We need more people in Scotland, not less… our 
population is getting older and that’s not a recipe for 
success… so we definitely need more migrants in 
Scotland’ 
Wayne. inter-company organisation   
Spurs economic growth and net fiscal benefit  ‘High end immigration is what is required to drive the 
economy recovery…and these people are paying huge 
quantities of tax, so it makes no sense whatsoever to 
limit it’. 
Paula, finance company  
Boost Scottish economy by filling skills and labour 
gaps  
‘Dentists are in very short supply in Scotland… and 
Romania has got exactly the same dentistry 
qualification, so academically they are absolutely a 
hundred per cent qualified for the role’.  
Daniel, recruitment firm  
Positive characteristics of migrants  ‘A lot of the A8 workers are skilled professionals and 
they’ve settled here and contributed to the local 
economy, unlike our unemployed they don’t rely on 
benefits… it’s not in their culture’.  
Thomas, hospitality recruitment firm  
 
 
As the above quotations illustrate, respondents made plausible cases for why their desires for 
migrant labour were closely aligned with the interests of Scotland more generally. These 
narratives involved the construction of a discourse that Scotland was ‘different’ to other parts 
of the UK, particularly southern England and as such merited a ‘distinctive’ policy approach 
to immigration.  
‘The demographic situation here [in Scotland] is frightening, so we definitely need migrants. 
We need more people in Scotland, not less… the rest of the UK, actually sorry the South East 
of England in particular, probably doesn’t need them and they have got some real problems 
with immigration… but Scotland’s problems in that area are not the same at all and we 
shouldn’t allow UK immigration to be dictated by London I’m afraid’.  
Wayne, inter-company organisation 
 
Scholarly musings on the construction of differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ in national 
contexts have a long history and are perhaps best exemplified by Said’s (1978) feted treatises 
concerning Orientalism and Othering. These ideas are particularly interesting in the Scotland-
UK context. As Cohen (1994) has ably noted, the UK is unusual in having four distinct 
‘nations’ (Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland) within a single state. Thus when 
Wayne refers to differing migration needs and experiences between ‘we’ (Scotland) and ‘they’ 
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(rest of the UK/South-East England), he invokes the notion of the idiosyncratic psychological 
‘fuzzy’ internal boundaries that prevail within the UK (Cohen, 1995). These complex processes 
of spatial differentiation play an important role in making the case for different policy measures 
across space. Framing Scotland as different from ‘the rest of the UK/South-East England’ (in 
economic, demographic or cultural terms) seeks to rally support for more geographically 
nuanced immigration policies.  
 
In contrast to other research (Anderson and Ruhs, 2010; Koven and Götzke, 2010; Facchini et 
al, 2008), which often presents employers as solely promoting the benefits of immigration, it 
was clear from the interviews that respondents acknowledged the potential negative 
externalities of their business needs for immigration. There was recognition that public and 
political concern existed in relation to immigration and that they could ‘understand’ this 
unease.  
‘I can completely understand why the UK Government would want to control unskilled 
immigration, because we are all British and we want to do what’s best for Britain, so we do 
have to be aware of the unemployment issue and of bringing people through the ranks… we all 
get that. But we are restricted because there is lot of unemployed people in Scotland and most 
of them just do not have the skills to work in such a dangerous environment’.  
Olivia, oil and gas 
 
Note Olivia’s contention that ‘we are all British’ and ‘want to do what’s best for Britain’. This 
view stands in contrast with many other employers, who positioned ‘what’s best for Britain’ 
(particularly southern England) as being against Scotland’s interests. In this sense, 
constructions of place play an important role in the narratives used to rationalise views towards 
immigration policy, and the extent to which business and/or public interest fits with ‘national’ 
interest.  
 
Whilst the business gains from immigration were praised and prioritised, familiar pejorative 
stereotypes surrounding immigrants emerged, reflecting ambivalence about immigration on the 
part of the very people whose companies benefitted from it.   
‘Scotland financially could not cope with an influx of hundreds of thousands of Eastern 
Europeans… we refuse to take Latvians and Lithuanians now because their work ethic is 
shocking. They come here and they don’t work, they just want to come and drink… 
unfortunately our benefits system seems to look like a pot of gold, so they [migrants] just come 
over and live off it’. 
Harriet, agribusiness  
 
Employers, often invoking Scotland’s distinct ‘needs’, universally praised the advantages of 
immigration from a business perspective (see Table 2), yet many of the very same individuals 
made disparaging comments about migrants. This apparent contradiction, which could be 
termed pro-migration with nuance, might seem curious under a conventional reading of the 
practices and preferences of economic actors as powerful ‘elites’ pursuing economically 
rational policy outcomes. However in terms of thinking about how employers are conceived of 
in academic research, the analysis uncovered multiple instances of employers reporting their 
personal ‘values’, with all of their associated contradictions and irrationalities, as opposed to 
the functional ‘values’ of their firm. This points towards the need for researchers to be critically 
reflective of how they elect to portray ‘elite’ actors in the political-economy of immigration 
policy: elites are ultimately individuals situated within larger social, economic and political 
networks and structures which inevitably shape their values (Cormode and Hughes, 1999).  
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The ‘ideal’ immigration policy for Scotland  
The previous section has argued that employers construct narratives which make a case for 
immigration policies that suit their business interests by positioning their case relative to 
Scotland’s ‘problems’ and what ‘we need’ in Scotland. It has also highlighted the importance 
of thinking carefully about how the voices of ‘elites’ such as employers are presented in 
migration studies. The analysis now turns to consideration of the ‘ideal’ Scottish immigration 
policy from the perspective of employers. At the time that the research was carried out Scotland 
did not have direct control over immigration policy. However most respondents felt that the 
Scottish Government would soon have greater control over at least some elements of it in the 
near future, either through independence or enhanced devolution of powers from Westminster.  
In sum, employer preferences centred on a desire for continued labour mobility within Europe, 
as provided under EU law, and a wish for measures to enhance the ability of businesses to 
recruit highly skilled workers through changes to the UK five-tier Points Based System (PBS) 
for migrants from outside the EU. Rather than a radical liberalisation of immigration policy, 
interviewees generally called for pragmatic and quite minor adjustments to legislation, were 
Scotland to gain the relevant policy levers to shape its own immigration policy. Other 
interviewees were generally content with and therefore in favour of a continuation of the status 
quo with regards to the legislative environment governing immigration.  
‘The free movement of both goods and people is very important to us, so if we [Scotland] 
become independent then for reasons of competitiveness it’d be more important to be a member 
of the European Union than anything else… but as things stand we do well already out of 
Europe and the free movement that it brings’.  
James, logistics and transport 
 
The level of contentment with, or at least lack of widespread opposition to, current UK 
immigration policy was perhaps surprising given suggestions from the literature that business 
is fundamentally in favour of liberal immigration policies (Giordani and Ruta, 2011; Cerna, 
2014).  However when employers did raise concerns they often related not so much to concrete 
policy measures but to the negative rhetoric surrounding immigration at the UK level.  
 
‘We have to make sure that we are open for business in terms of the migration of talent and 
that we are seen in that way too. We kind of have that here [Scotland] because there is a very 
strong cross-party consensus that the free movement of people is absolutely crucial to 
Scotland’s wellbeing… but I don’t think that the UK at the moment is really positioning itself 
as open and welcoming for the attraction of international talent’.  
Toby, higher education  
 
In this sense Scotland was positioned as being ‘different’ to the rest of the UK, where generally 
positive discourses were compared favourably to the perceived negatively surrounding political 
discussions of immigration south of the border.   
‘Alex Salmond has positively welcomed them [migrants] and said that they’ll be welcomed to 
Scotland and local government too has been really good for funding free language lessons… 
but there’s the racism aspect down in England where they’re saying they’re all thieves, gypsies 
and beggars, so people are coming up to Scotland because they know that there’s less racism 
here’  
Thomas, recruitment, hospitality 
 
In terms of the political-economy of immigration policy, conceptually what is of interest is not 
the particular legislative mechanisms that employers would like to see enacted, but rather the 
discourses that are constructed to rationalise these aims, and the actions that are made to 
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actualise them. These narratives tended to centre on the ‘exceptional’ nature of Scotland’s 
(economic and demographic) ‘needs’ for migrants and how the ability to attract hyper mobile 
‘top talent’ was seen as essential to the success of companies and economies in an intensely 
competitive global arena. In this sense what was ‘good’ or ‘essential’ for employers in terms 
of immigration was constructed as being inevitably ‘good’ or ‘essential’ for Scotland. In line 
with the observations of scholars such as Scott (2013), employers were less likely to portray 
immigration in terms that framed it as an important mechanism in the hegemony of capital over 
labour. Analysis of the interview transcripts also leads to a questioning of the depiction of 
‘business interests’ as a homogenous, unified or even powerful voice in immigration policy. 
Rather, in what could be termed pro-migration without policy detail, employer desires were 
often poorly articulated, conflicted with each other and often did not advocate purely ‘open-
door’ immigration policies. This complexity in terms of ‘elite’ voices extended to how 
employers sought to influence immigration policy.  
 
‘Elite’ domination over immigration policy?  
Employer pressure is often framed as being influential in states producing immigration policies 
that are more liberal than their citizens would like (Menz, 2011). This is presented as the 
outcome of an organised pro-migration lobby ‘winning over’ a larger but resource weak and 
diffuse anti-migration lobby (Freeman, 1995). Determining whether employer voices 
ultimately ‘win’ in immigration policy is beyond the scope of this paper, and perhaps empirical 
elucidation more generally. What does however emerge from the research is an appreciation of 
the limited efficacy of so-called elite attitudes and actions in relation to immigration policy 
(Giordani and Ruta, 2011). The constitutional change debate proved to be a valuable lens 
through which employer views and influence on immigration policy could be explored: with 
many interviewees describing the situation as an opportunity for more favourable legislation 
to develop.  
‘Scottish independence could create better policy responses to our needs, and it is much easier 
to get the ear of a Minister here than it is in the UK Government… but the Scottish Government 
would be pressurised by everybody; the oil industry, retail, hospitality and manufacturing think 
they’ll all going to get the ear of government and that they’ll prioritise their respective 
industries, but some of them will have to lose out’.  
Rory, healthcare 
 
As the above quotation illustrates, employers inevitably have competing demands on 
government priorities. In line with Caviedes (2010) this range of preferences unsurprisingly 
leads to divisions between and within economic sectors in relation to which ‘elite’ voices are 
heard.  
‘Independence would mean that we could sort out all of those messy migration policies that we 
have issues with, but given that the Yes campaign makes a big deal out of the oil industry, they 
really need to talk to the oil industry... they’re engaging with organisations like the Wood 
Group because of Sir Ian Wood, but they are not engaging with the vast majority of other 
businesses that are actually supporting the sector and who produce more money for the UK 
than these guys do’.  
Olivia, oil and gas 
 
Even when interviewees did claim to make efforts to influence (both UK and Scottish) 
government policy, it was unclear how these processes operate or what their actual effects 
might be. This may be attributed to three key factors: (1) employers, whilst wishing to send out 
a message that immigration was broadly beneficial, were not particularly articulate in terms of 
what types of specific legislation they actually wanted, (2) interviewees were uncertain whether 
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their efforts at influencing policy had any measurable impact and (3) research participants 
displayed a limited understanding of the actual mechanisms through which their preferences 
might be translated into policy. Thus whilst there was a consensus that disseminating positive 
messages about immigration to politicians, policymakers, the media and the public was 
desirable, much less confidence surrounded whether this had a tangible effect on policy. For 
example Wayne (inter-company organisation) complained that ‘we try and guide economic 
policy in Scotland so that business is doing better, but growing the economy and business is a 
minority voice in Scotland’. Similarly Harriet (agribusiness) protested that ‘we are lobbying 
and rural MPs are putting in reports too but it just doesn’t matter, you might as well be 
speaking to a brick wall’.   
 
The picture that emerges from this analysis is not therefore one that conforms to the notion of 
state immigration polices being at the behest of an articulate, unified and powerful pro-business 
voice. It can be reasonably assumed that pro-business voices do influence immigration policy, 
but in probability they do so in often indirect, unintended and imperceptible ways. The 
perception of employers (and others) as dominant ‘elites’ manipulating immigration policy 
may therefore be misplaced. A conclusion that is more realistic ties in with the notion of policy 
incoherence: elites in all probability do influence immigration policy, but do so in numerous 
and complex ways that are difficult for researchers and even elites to identify and articulate 
(Boswell, 2007; Menz, 2011; Statham and Geddes, 2006).  
 
Discussion: re-thinking ‘elite’ voices in migration research  
Immigration policy theory is an important but under researched topic. This analysis has sought 
to contribute to its development by focusing on a particular aspect of the relationship between 
businesses and the state and its public; the preferences and role of employers with regards to 
immigration legislation. This perspective has pointed towards the need for a more critical take 
on the narratives used by businesses to rationalise their favouring of more liberal immigration 
policies than the public would like and contradictions within articulations of their ‘ideal’ 
immigration policy. It also emphasises that, counter to some opinion, immigration policy 
should not be viewed as the result of an organised pro-migration lobby ‘winning over’ a 
resource weak and diffuse anti-migration lobby (Freeman, 1995).   
 
The research findings support the expectation that employers are generally very much in favour 
of immigration, as it serves to enhance the supply of labour available to them and thus helps to 
address skills and labour shortages. Narratives used to rationalise a pro-immigration stance 
centred on immigration being inherently ‘good’ for Scotland and Scotland’s economic and 
demographic needs being ‘different’ to other parts of Britain, especially the South East of 
England. Uncertainty over the constitutional future of Scotland was regarded as an opportunity 
by employers, who saw it as a chance to raise and perhaps push for policies better suited to 
‘Scotland’s needs’. A critical interpretation of these discourses leads one to reflect on what is 
not voiced by employers. As Scott (2013) and Anderson and Ruhs (2010) have emphasised, 
few if any businesses will interpret increased labour immigration as a mechanism favouring 
the intensification of workplace regimes and exerting downward pressure on wages and 
conditions for employees, migrant and non-migrant alike. The role of immigration in 
facilitating the escalation of ‘flexible’ labour market structures, at various levels of the 
occupational hierarchy, is an issue that merits much more attention than it has received to date 
(Røed and Schøne, 2012; McCollum and Findlay, 2015; Castles and Kosack, 2010). 
 
Whilst employer preferences for positive approaches to immigration legislation have long been 
acknowledged (Castles and Kosack, 1973), an important contribution of this analysis is that it 
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encourages a more nuanced understanding of how ‘elites’ such as employers are portrayed in 
migration studies. This investigation points to the reality of employer preferences and practices 
being complex and often contradictory, as typified by a general desire for policy to provide 
them with ‘good’ migrants, but with reservations and without a detailed policy knowledge or 
associated organised base. The narrow neo-classical view of labour migrants as economically 
rational and utility maximising units has long been open to the charge from postmodernists that 
such a representation discounts the innate contradictions and complexity of human thought and 
action (Papastergiadis, 2000). Whilst understandings of migrant behaviour have evolved far 
beyond simplistic rational choice models, elites such as employers are still often framed as 
behaving in such a deterministic manner. However this research uncovered many instances of 
employers thinking and acting in ways that contradict expectations of private businesses as 
purely profit maximising actors. For example many interviewees freely drew attention to the 
perceived negative aspects of immigration and used pejorative terminology to describe 
immigrants. So whilst the literature might conceive of business elites as being more concerned 
with success in a globalised economic arena than parochial national political issues (Lasch, 
1995; Sklair, 1991), the reality is more nuanced. It is sometimes forgotten that business ‘elites’ 
are also individuals and as such are situated within and influenced by wider networks and 
structures (Cormode and Hughes, 1999). So although their overall stance can be described as 
pro-immigration, their views and the narratives that they use to rationalise them can be thought 
of as unstable and internally contradictory as a consequence of this embeddedness (Shubin et 
al, 2014). The views of ‘the public’ and private business, whilst distinctly different, may 
therefore not be quite as far apart as is sometimes assumed. Employers are in the main pro-
immigration, but not without reservation. Similarly social attitudes data shows that the public 
is generally opposed to immigration, yet recognises the positive economic aspects of it (Saran, 
2009; Rolfe et al, 2013; Duffy and Frere-Smith, 2014). A more sophisticated interpretation of 
the preferences of so-called elites and general publics is thus warranted in migration studies.  
 
Finally, the analysis rejects the view of immigration policy as being determined by the lobbying 
efforts of an organised and coherent body of ‘elites’. Just like the public, employers express 
dissatisfaction with immigration policy (although usually for different reasons). Whilst this 
research cannot shed light on the actual impact of pro-business preferences on immigration 
policy, it can encourage a more sophisticated conceptualisation of these key labour market 
actors in migration studies. Employers hold divergent views and are not particularly articulate 
regarding the immigration policies that they would like to see, are not confident that their voices 
are listened to by policymakers and are unsure of the mechanisms whereby their preferences 
might be translated into policies. How a diverse set of competing voices are translated into 
immigration policy therefore remains something of a ‘black box’ in the minds of businesses 
and indeed the authors of this article. Whose voices are prioritised by policymakers in these 
tussles remains an important question that is very difficult to prove. The perennial question of 
whose voices should be listened to is of even greater significance.   
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